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free from both U.S. dominance and the 
liberal values espoused by the United 
States and other industrialized democ-
racies. Many believed that Washington’s 
stated uneasiness about standards actu-
ally masked a geopolitical concern that 
the bank was the first step in an effort 
by Beijing to construct a Sinocentric 
world order.
The U.S. attempt to halt or marginal-
ize the aiib failed miserably. The bank 
was launched in 2015, and by the middle 
of the next year, a host of close U.S. allies, 
including Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Israel, South Korea, and the 
United Kingdom (although with the 
notable exception of Japan), had defied 
Washington and signed up. 
How could Washington have misread 
the intentions of so many of its allies and 
ended up isolating itself rather than 
Beijing? Could it have handled China’s 
initiative differently? And what does 
Washington’s failure say about the United 
States’ chances of further integrating 
Beijing into the existing order? 
The answers have little to do with 
the details of the new bank or Asian 
infrastructure spending. Instead, they 
require a balanced understanding of 
the role China has begun to play in 
contemporary international relations 
and the serious challenge Beijing poses.
Most important, China is a disruptive 
power but not a revolutionary one. Its 
size, wealth, and assertive foreign policy 
lead it to demand significant changes to 
existing institutions, but it does not seek 
to overturn the current international 
order wholesale. Just half a century ago, 
Mao Zedong’s China did indeed offer a 
distinctly revolutionary vision of world 
politics and China’s role in it. Today, in 
contrast, Beijing doggedly pursues its 
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In 2013, China launched an initiative to establish a new multilateral devel-opment institution, the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank. The aiib, 
Beijing argued, could help fill a multi-
trillion-dollar gap in financing for railways, 
roads, power plants, and other infra-
structure in the world’s fastest-growing 
region. But the United States treated 
China’s proposal as a challenge to the 
existing regional and global develop-
ment institutions that it had helped 
establish in the decades after World 
War II. Washington not only refused to 
join the bank itself but also launched a 
quiet diplomatic campaign to dissuade 
its allies from doing so either. 
Washington contended that the new 
institution could undermine the existing 
system by offering investment without 
imposing the anticorruption and envi-
ronmental standards used by existing 
groups. And some in Washington also 
implied that Beijing had a deeper pur-
pose: to construct an alternative set of 
China-oriented international institutions 
Evan A. Feigenbaum
34 f o r e i g n  a f fa i r s
national interests and territorial claims 
yet lacks a coherent alternative to the 
prevailing system and is actually a mem-
ber of nearly every one of the existing 
major institutions. Yet China is a reluc-
tant stakeholder—inside the tent, but 
still ambivalent and often dissatisfied.
China’s extraordinary rise in recent 
decades has earned it the leverage to 
demand a greater say in international 
affairs. It has acquired growing military 
power, trillions of dollars in foreign 
exchange reserves that can be recycled 
into direct investments, and new influ-
ence in developing countries from Africa 
to Central Asia. These facts mean that 
Beijing can now either support or under-
mine regional and global governance. 
Dealing with China’s rise and revision-
ism will require greater creativity and 
strategic coherence than the West has 
displayed to date.
REFORM AND OPENING UP
As recently as the 1960s and 1970s, a 
very different China sought to over-
turn much of the international system. 
Mao isolated the country’s economy 
and society from most outside influ-
ences, opposed nearly every major 
global institution, and offered a revolu-
tionary vision of an anticapitalist 
global order. This went beyond fiery 
rhetoric: China promoted internal, 
often violent revolution against gov-
ernments in several countries, from 
Bolivia to Borneo. 
Today, Beijing is as determined as 
ever to advance its interests in a variety 
of ways and forums, but even when it 
advocates alternatives or works outside 
the system, it often apes and adapts 
practices from existing institutions, as  
it is doing with the aiib. 
Washington’s response has been to 
both welcome China’s new role and 
try to manage it. Even when they were 
working to bring China into the system, 
many in the United States understood 
that Beijing might disrupt international 
governance and established practices. As 
a result, around a decade ago, Washing-
ton began to change its approach. The 
United States sought more aggressively 
to channel China’s energies and preempt 
a potential challenge from Beijing to 
existing institutions. 
In 2005, Robert Zoellick, the U.S. 
deputy secretary of state, gave a speech 
that laid out this new strategy. Zoellick 
sought to shift the focus of Washington’s 
China policy away from the question of 
whether Beijing was in or out of major 
institutions to the broader issue of its 
conduct and choices. He noted that 
China, having joined the World Trade 
Organization four years earlier, had 
nearly completed the process of inte-
grating itself into the established world 
order. It had joined most of the major 
institutions that it had once opposed and, 
on paper at least, subscribed to major 
treaties and protocols on issues as diverse 
as ozone depletion and chemical weapons. 
U.S. policy, Zoellick argued, needed to 
change dramatically as a result. “It is 
time to take our policy beyond opening 
doors to China’s membership into the 
international system,” he said. “We need 
to urge China to become a responsible 
stakeholder in that system.” 
Part of the motivation behind Zoellick’s 
speech was to address Beijing’s tendency 
to free-ride on the security and stability 
provided by the United States in both Asia 
and the rest of the world. In Afghanistan, 
for example, China derived considerable 
benefits from the U.S.-led war against 
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it is still often skeptical of them and 
dissatisfied with their workings. 
Three specific aspects of China’s 
emergence are making U.S. efforts to 
defend the existing architecture more 
difficult. First, China does not subscribe 
to the liberal norms of the countries 
that established the world’s international 
institutions—and sought to inject their 
values into them—after World War II. 
This resistance stems not just from China’s 
own illiberal, Leninist political system 
but also from historical circumstances, 
most notably its claim to Taiwan, that 
have given it a traditional and distinctly 
noninterventionist worldview. In the 
1990s, for example, when the United 
States used military force in Panama, 
Haiti, and the Balkans, China’s concern 
with its own territorial disputes bolstered 
its opposition to intervention by Western 
powers. That position soon hardened into 
broad resistance to the use of established 
al Qaeda and the Taliban, including the 
elimination of a terrorist threat across its 
western border and the creation of a more 
stable government in Kabul. But China 
contributed little to the effort, relative to 
its economic size. And in the decade 
since then, China’s power and global role 
have only grown. At the 2009 G-20 
meeting in Pittsburgh, for example, it 
sought larger voting shares in the World 
Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (imf). In 1999, it ceased to be 
eligible for loans from the International 
Development Association, and in the 
middle of this decade, it instead became a 
contributor to it. And it has joined, and 
even begun to co-finance projects with, 
most of the major regional development 
banks, including the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. Yet although China has become a 
stakeholder in these and other institutions, 
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On the march: Chinese soldiers on an island in the South China Sea, January 2016
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This strategy is best described as 
portfolio diversification, whereby Beijing 
expands its institutional options in order 
to serve multiple goals. It seeks to hedge 
its commitment to Western-led groups 
lest they fail to accommodate China’s 
interests or turn against China, gain 
leverage to demand faster and deeper 
reforms to existing structures, “democ-
ratize” international governance by 
establishing groups not led by the G-7 
industrialized democracies, put Wash-
ington on notice that Beijing can and 
will seek alternatives if its calls for change 
are ignored, and get things done in areas, 
such as infrastructure funding, where 
efforts by the United States and existing 
groups have been inadequate. 
The third challenge for Washington 
has been Beijing’s expectation that its 
own increased role will naturally reduce 
the influence of smaller European democ-
racies. China is the world’s largest trader, 
manufacturer, and emitter of carbon and 
boasts its second-largest economy. Since 
global economic and environmental prob-
lems cannot be solved without its partici-
pation, the only way to make existing 
institutions functional, Beijing argues, 
is to make them more representative. 
For Washington, however, rebalancing 
power in this way poses an uncomfortable 
tradeoff between liberalism and effective-
ness. The more Western-dominated an 
institution, the more likely it is to have a 
liberal bias, but the less representative—
and perhaps less functional—it will be. 
One example of this is the International 
Energy Agency, initially a group of 
the world’s major oil consumers, whose 
membership and the voting shares of 
whose members have largely been frozen 
since the group’s founding in 1974. As a 
result, it does not include China or India, 
institutions to carry out liberal interven-
tions when, in 1999, the United States 
intervened in the Balkans again but this 
time bypassed the un Security Council, 
where China could have wielded its veto, 
and instead relied on nato to legitimize 
the mission. This divergence between 
Chinese and Western views has hindered 
U.S.-Chinese cooperation, notably in 
Iraq and Syria. 
Second, although China has joined, 
and become an increasingly active mem-
ber of, existing groups and pacts, it has 
also tried to diversify the system by 
supporting competitors to them: it has 
endorsed a handful of parallel structures, 
such as the brics group of major emerg-
ing economies (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), which launched 
annual summits in 2009 and has formed 
a development bank and a contingency 
reserve fund.
The aiib exemplifies this dual 
approach. The bank’s formation was a 
clear statement of Beijing’s discontent 
with what it saw as the failure of the 
current system to reform and embrace a 
larger Chinese role fast enough, as well 
as a warning that China has the capacity 
and will to work outside it. And yet China 
did not abandon the old institutions: it 
remains the third-largest funder of the 
aiib’s closest competitor, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, and is increasingly active 
in the World Bank. Moreover, China 
focused its discontent on an area where 
these banks had proved to be inadequate. 
In 2016, the adb predicted that funding 
for infrastructure in Asia would require 
nearly $1 trillion a year until 2020, of 
which governments could supply only 
about 60 percent. So Beijing could argue 
persuasively that the aiib complemented, 
rather than threatened, the current system. 
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the world’s first- and third-largest 
energy consumers, respectively (although 
China has signed an association agree-
ment with it, and the group has a pro-
gram of cooperation with India), and it 
gives outsize weight to small European 
states that were major oil importers in 
the 1970s but no longer are. The result 
is a less functional institution on issues 
such as the coordination of stockpiles and 
technical standards. 
A MORE INTEGRATED ASIA 
But it is in Asia, not in global institu-
tions, that the United States faces its 
toughest choices about how to respond 
to China’s growing activism. Particularly 
since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 –98, 
when the United States refused to bail 
out Thailand and the imf’s rescue condi-
tions were viewed across the region as too 
harsh, several countries, not just China, 
have promoted regional structures in Asia 
that exclude the United States. Resisting 
these threats to U.S. influence will be 
tough for Washington because they have 
deeper roots than just rising Chinese 
ambition. In fact, the region has a long 
tradition of pan-Asian ideas, negotia-
tions, and pacts, even among countries 
that are U.S. allies and deeply suspicious 
of China. 
Take Japan. Since Tokyo views the 
rise of Chinese power with deep distrust, 
some have argued that it and the United 
States should lead an effort to counter 
China’s supposedly new pan-Asianism. 
But Japan itself has promoted pan-Asian 
ideas in the past. It was Japanese officials 
who, in 1997, suggested the establishment 
of an Asian monetary fund to fight future 
financial crises, a proposal that helped 
give rise to today’s Chiang Mai Initia-
tive, a system of bilateral currency 
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including the United States. A promi-
nent example is China’s ambitious Belt 
and Road infrastructure program. Since 
President Xi Jinping launched it in 2013, 
this multibillion-dollar effort to connect 
Asia by building new roads, rails, ports, 
and power lines has been portrayed as an 
attempt to make the rest of the continent 
dependent on China’s economy. But 
the notion of regional connection is no 
Chinese invention. Many countries, 
including India, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, and even the United States have 
helped build or finance such links across 
Asia. For example, it is Japan, not China, 
that is financing the Delhi Metro and 
the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor, 
a $90 billion high-tech industrial zone 
and freight route connecting India’s 
political and economic capitals. And it 
was not Beijing but U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice, the World Bank, 
and the adb that pressed for the devel-
opment of Central and South Asian 
roads and power lines in the middle of 
the first decade of this century. 
What this means for Washington is 
that it need not view initiatives such as 
the aiib or the Belt and Road as under-
mining U.S. efforts. But it does mean 
that Asian economies are increasingly 
looking to one another, rather than the 
West, for investment and economic 
cooperation. The likely result is that by 
the 2030s, Asia will more closely resem-
ble the integrated continent that existed 
before the United States’ arrival—more 
“Asia” than “Asia-Pacific”—than the one 
U.S. policymakers have grown accus-
tomed to since the end of World War II.
THE BEST DEFENSE 
Adjusting to this new reality ranks 
among the principal strategic chal-
swaps among Southeast and Northeast 
Asian countries intended to serve a 
similar purpose. 
The main pan-Asian alternative to 
U.S.-led trade initiatives, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 
is also not a Chinese idea. Ever since 
rcep has become the principal competitor 
to Washington’s preferred trade pact, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp), U.S. 
officials, including President Barack 
Obama, have portrayed it as a Chinese 
vehicle—an example of Beijing’s attempts 
to “write the rules” of the region in op-
position to the United States. But the 
story is not nearly so simple. Rcep was 
largely a Southeast Asian initiative and 
includes countries—Australia, India, 
Japan, and Vietnam—that are among 
the most skeptical of Beijing’s motives 
in Asia. In fact, around half the countries 
that are involved in the tpp negotiations 
are also involved in rcep. The most 
likely prospect, then, is that if the United 
States fails to ratify the tpp, these coun-
tries will jointly write new pan-Asian 
rules, not accept ones dictated by China. 
It is also worth noting that China often 
succeeds at its efforts to reform global 
institutions and build pan-Asian groups 
because its demands mesh with those of 
India, an increasingly close U.S. partner. 
For example, India helped found the 
aiib and now ranks as its second-largest 
shareholder. Despite their suspicion of 
Chinese power, officials in New Delhi 
tend to agree that new forums act as a 
needed counterweight to unrepresenta-
tive global institutions. Like China, India 
is not content to live in perpetuity in 
architecture largely built by the West. 
China’s pan-Asian initiatives also gain 
traction by borrowing and adapting ideas 
that have long been advocated by others, 
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business will remain crucial in Asia; 
U.S. companies have invested more 
than $200 billion in Southeast Asian 
countries alone. But what is at stake 
is not business but rules, norms, and 
standards. Washington will lose influ-
ence over regulations governing invest-
ment, technology standards, labor, 
and environmental practices. 
What the United States should be 
encouraging is a liberal, open, market-
based economic order in the region. 
And the tpp by itself would not have 
been enough, in any case. Rather than 
abandoning the deal, Washington should 
be supplementing it, by negotiating 
bilateral investment treaties with China 
and India to open up their economies 
to U.S. firms and to support economic 
reformers in both countries; pursuing 
public-private partnerships to get U.S. 
businesses involved in infrastructure 
development across Asia; striking specific 
agreements to open up markets in the 
service and technology sectors, where 
the United States excels; and seeking 
new pacts in areas such as fishing and 
environmental standards for China’s 
Belt and Road project. Doing so would 
mean that Washington was helping set 
the agenda, not merely reacting to 
Chinese proposals. 
But the use of this form of U.S. 
economic statecraft now seems likely 
to wane. Thus, as its influence declines, 
the United States must find ways to rely 
more on its allies to act as a counterbal-
ance to China where the United States 
cannot or will not do so itself. In Thai-
land, for example, Japan’s sway has grown 
as Washington’s has receded because of 
Tokyo’s consistent pursuit of investment 
partnerships and political engagement 
with the military junta in Bangkok.
lenges Washington faces in Asia. So 
far, however, it has adapted badly to 
China’s global role and especially to its 
new pan-Asian initiatives. Washington 
can and must do better. For one thing, 
U.S. policymakers need to pick their 
fights more carefully. There will be 
many contests of wills in the years to 
come over regional and global order, 
and so Washington will have to exercise 
discretion. In the case of the aiib, for 
instance, the United States contested 
a major Chinese initiative in an area 
where existing structures were clearly 
insufficient and Washington itself 
offered no alternative U.S.-centered 
model. In doing so, it turned China’s 
multilateral proposal into a bilateral 
test of wills that it was almost certain 
to lose: it had no real leverage over 
Beijing and badly misread sentiment 
among its allies. 
Another lesson is that the United 
States should not force its allies into  
a binary choice between Beijing and 
Washington on issues that are not 
vital to U.S. national security or to 
the national security of its allies. In 
the South China Sea, where China is 
challenging maritime law and custom-
ary practice, such pressure is necessary. 
But China’s financing of a commercial 
railway or power line is not a compa-
rable threat. 
And ultimately, the United States 
needs to be clear-eyed about where its 
vital interests dictate that it get more 
skin in the game. Trade is the best exam-
ple of an area where it should. With the 
election of Donald Trump, the United 
States seems almost certain to abandon 
the tpp. So Washington should expect 
Asian countries to fill the vacuum and 
write their own rules. To be sure, U.S. 
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geography and economics. And doing 
so would cause it to miss opportunities 
to work with China—for example, in 
Central Asia, where U.S. interests 
align more closely with China’s than 
with Russia’s.
The bottom line is that Washington 
spends far too much time and energy 
reacting to China’s moves. Instead, it 
should be active and exploit U.S. 
strengths, such as technology, innova-
tion, and connections to global capital 
markets, as it works with a diverse 
array of Asian partners to help balance 
China’s growing influence. The best 
way to adapt to China’s new activism 
is to mount a stronger offense, not play 
perpetual defense.∂
The final lesson is that the interna-
tional system cannot function unless it 
incorporates the largest and fastest-
growing countries. If it fails to adequately 
include China, India, and other emerging 
economies, they will simply turn else-
where. That means formal European 
and, to a lesser extent, U.S. influence 
in most international institutions will 
have to shrink in the years ahead. So 
if the United States is to preserve the 
system’s liberal tilt, it will need to rely 
more heavily on informal means. That 
will entail creating ad hoc groups of 
states to work on specific issues outside 
the system’s formal architecture and 
extracting more from China in exchange 
for accommodating its growing stature. 
The recent decision to accede to Beijing’s 
demand that the yuan be included in 
the imf’s Special Drawing Rights, a 
basket of major reserve currencies used 
by the fund, provides an example of 
how this could be done. If, instead of 
agreeing outright, Washington and 
the imf had insisted on breaking the 
process up into successive steps, each 
pegged to specific reforms of China’s 
capital markets, they could still have 
brought China into the system while 
also bolstering China’s own economic 
reformers. 
China will no doubt continue to 
propose initiatives similar to the aiib 
that leverage the country’s strengths. 
It makes no sense for U.S. officials to 
respond by wringing their hands. In 
addition to the advantages that its posi-
tion at the geographic heart of Asia 
confers, China can deploy trillions in 
state-backed finance, something the 
United States cannot do. To reject every 
Chinese initiative outright, then, would 
require Washington to fight both 
